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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
injury.'" Therefore, the court found that the exclusion of evidence of
the social significance of the defendant's activity was proper.s However,
it was noted that, where injunctive relief is sought, the court will con-
sider the comparative hardships which will result from the issuance or
denial of the injunction.9
CONCLUSION
In lost, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that
in actions for damages only, the issue of whether or not the defendant
has committed a wrongful act will in no way depend on the utility of
his activity.1" Evidence of the social importance of the offending conduct
could contribute to the danger that the jury will be influenced by extra-
neous matters such as the effect their decision will have on the com-
munity's electric rates. While not a radical departure from existing law
in Wisconsin, the clear decision in lost-that in nuisance actions solely
for damages the plaintiff will be compensated for injuries by the pollu-
tion-nuisance without regard for the social utility of the defendant's
conduct-should provide some measure of relief to injured parties and
some comfort to the environmentalists.
W. CRAIG OLAFSSON
Private Nuisance: Abatement of Air Pollution In Boomer v.
Atlantic Cement Company, Inc:' Landowners brought a private
nuisance action to enjoin the operation of a neighboring cement plant
from polluting the air through the emission of dust and raw materials
and the conducting of excessive blasting in the operation of its plant.
The landowners also sought damages for the nuisance. The lower court
found that a private nuisance did exist and that it had caused the plain-
tiffs substantial injury. The Court of Appeals accepted both findings. 2
The heart of the appeal was the contention by the cement company that
an award of permanent damages, and not an abatement order, was the
proper remedy. Noting the Cement Company represented an invest-
7 Id. at 177, 172 N.W.2d at 654.8 Id. at 176, 172 N.W.2d at 653.
9 Id. at 177, 172 N.W.2d at 654. See Dolata v. Berthelet Fuel Supply Co., supra
note 4, at198-199, 36 N.W.2d at 99; Holman v. Mineral Point Zinc Co., supra
note 4, at 137, 115 N.W. at 329; Abdella v. Smith, supra note 4, at 398-400,
149 N.W.2d at 539-540.
10 45 Wis. 2d at 177, 172 N.W.2d at 654. The rule was first propounded in Wis-
consin in 1883 in Pennoyer v. Allen, supra note 3.
1309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
2 Id., at 315.
3 The court found that the rate of technical advances in the reduction of parti-
culate contamination was beyond the control of the defendant, and in fact
depended on the total resources of the industry. To demand that this defend-
ant either discover a technical solution within a short time or cease operation,
reasoned the court, would be both unrealistic and unfair. Accordingly, the
court ordered the trial to issue an injunction which was to be vacated upon
payment by the defendant of such permanent damages as the lower court
would find.
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ment in excess of 45 million dollars and employed over 300 people, and
that the pollution was unlikely to be eliminated by any technical ad-
vances which could be made by the defendant if an injunction was
merely delayed for a short period, the court declined to order a perma-
nent injunction, on the condition that the defendant pay damages to
the plaintiffs in compensation for this servitude on their land.3 Accord-
ing to the weight of authority, once it is found that a private nuisance
exists and is causing substantial damage, the activity should be enjoined
despite the fact that the resulting benefit to the plaintiff is small in
comparison to the economic harm to the defendant.4 The leading New
York case applying this rule was Whalen v. Union Paper Bag & Paper
Co.5 There a pulp mill which employed 500 and represented an invest-
ment of more than one million dollars was found to have wrongfully
polluted a stream, causing a lower riparian owner damages amounting
to one hundred dollars per year. The court issued an unconditional
injunction and stated "Although the damage to the plaintiff may be
slight as compared with the defendant's expense of abating the condi-
tion, that is not a good reason for refusing an injunction."'6 It was this
long-standing New York precedent which the Court of Appeals in
Boomer was specifically overruling in adoption of the "disparity of
economic consequences" approach.7
The court was careful to note that the scope of its decision was
limited to "within the four corners of these actions and does not fore-
close public health or other public agencies from seeking proper relief
in a proper court."8 The court was perhaps saying that with the burgeon-
ing interest in the prevention of air pollution, the proper method of
weighing the competing interest involved was not the case-by-case appli-
cation of traditional nuisance law, but rather the increased activity by
local, state and federal agencies to establish guidelines for the enforce-
ment of statutes enacted by Congress 9 and by state legislatures. For
example, under the Air Pollution Control Act of 1957,10 New York set
up its Air Pollution Control Board within its Department of Health
4 AMi. JUR. Nuisances § 159 (1942).5101 N.E. 805 (1913).
6 Id. at 806.
7309 N.Y.S.2d at 315.8 Id. at 317.
9 The public concern over air pollution gave birth to several federal acts, the
last of which is the Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485. With
this act Congress established a procedure whereby State standards for air
pollution are subject to review and rejection by the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare. A review of the statutory procedure reveals that
Congress intended to mount a comprehensive, systematic, and ultimately ef-
fective attack on the largely unexplored problem of proper air pollution con-
trol. This act was preceded by the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, Pub.
L. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322, which was significantly amended and expanded
both by the Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392, and by the
1967 Act.
10 N.Y. Public Health Law §§ 1264-1299 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
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(now administered by the Department of Environmental Conservation)
with power to "Formulate, adopt and promulgate, amend and repeal
codes and rules and regulations for preventing, controlling or prohibit-
ing air pollution,"'1 and to "Prepare and develop a general comprehen-
sive plan for the control or abatement of existing air pollution . . .,12
But whether or not executive and administrative authorities such as
this one are able to effectively combat the type of air pollution found
in the Boomer case, it is clear that a potentially significant antipollu-
tion weapon has been lost in New York-the weapon of the private
nuisance abatement action.
FRANCIS J. SLATTERY
11Id., § 1271(1) (a).12 Id., § 1271(2) (a). The Air Pollution Control Board formulatcd standards for
the prevention of particulate contamination in 1969. See Environment Re-
porter: State Air Laws at 461:0661 (1970).
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